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PRIVATE INFORMATION RETRIEVAL FROM CODED DATABASES
WITH COLLUDING SERVERS∗
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Abstract. We present a general framework for Private Information Retrieval (PIR) from arbi-
trary coded databases, that allows one to adjust the rate of the scheme to the suspected number of
colluding servers. If the storage code is a generalized Reed-Solomon code of length n and dimension
k, we design PIR schemes that achieve a PIR rate of
n−(k+t−1)
n
while protecting against any t
colluding servers, for any 1 ≤ t ≤ n − k. This interpolates between the previously studied cases of
t = 1 and k = 1 and achieves PIR capacity in both of these cases asymptotically as the number of
files in the database grows.
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1. Introduction. Private information retrieval (PIR) addresses the question of
how to retrieve data items from a database without disclosing information about
the identity of the data items retrieved, and was introduced by Chor, Goldreich,
Kushilevitz and Sudan in [4, 5]. The classic PIR model of [5] views the database as
an m-bit binary string x = [x1 · · ·xm] ∈ {0, 1}m, and assumes that the user wants
to retrieve a single bit xi without revealing any information about the index i. We
consider a natural extension of this model, wherein the database is a string x =
[x1 · · ·xm] of files xi, which are themselves bit strings, and the user wants to download
one of the files xi, without revealing its index.
The rate of a PIR scheme in this model is measured as the ratio of the gained
information over the downloaded information, while upload costs of the requests are
usually ignored. The trivial solution is to download the entire database. This, how-
ever, incurs a significant communication overhead whenever the database is large,
and is therefore not useful in practice. While the trivial solution is the only way to
guarantee information-theoretic privacy in the case of a single server [5], this problem
can be remedied by replicating the database onto k servers that do not communicate.
The study of PIR recently received renewed attention, when Shah, Rashmi,
Ramchandran and Kumar introduced a model of coded private information retrieval
(cPIR) [10, 11]. Here, all files are distributed over the servers according to a storage
code, so there is no assumption that the contents of all servers are identical. It is
shown in [10] that for a suitably constructed storage code, privacy can be guaranteed
by downloading a single bit more than the size of the desired file. However, this re-
quires exponentially many servers in terms of the number of files. Blackburn, Etzion
and Paterson achieved the same low download complexity with a linear number of
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servers [3]. This is a vast improvement upon [10], but still far from applicable storage
systems where the number of files tends to dwarf the number of servers.
While [10] effectively answered the question on how low the communication cost
of a PIR scheme can be, it highlighted another cost parameter that should not be
neglected in the era of big data, namely the storage overhead. We define the storage
overhead as the ratio of the total number of coded bits stored on all servers to the
total number of uncoded bits of data. Fazeli, Vardy and Yaakobi showed in [6] that
it is possible to reduce the storage overhead significantly. However, this requires
subpacketizing the file and distributing it over a number of servers that grows to
infinity as the desired storage overhead decreases.
In contrast to the schemes in [10], whose strengths appear as the number of servers
tends to infinity, we are considering the setting where we are given a storage system
with a fixed number of servers. While this in no way optimizes the storage overhead,
it does keep the overhead fixed. Moreover, we allow some subsets of servers to be
colluding, by which we mean that they may inform each other of their interaction with
the user. This is very natural in a distributed storage system where communication
between servers is required to recover data in the case of node failures. PIR over fixed
maximum distance separable (MDS) storage systems were considered in [16]. There,
two PIR schemes were presented for arbitrary [n, k] MDS codes, one of which had
rate 1n and protected against t = n− k colluding servers, and the other of which had
rate n−kn and t = 1. In Section 4 we present these as special instances of a scheme
that can handle any number 1 ≤ t ≤ n − k of colluding servers. Curiously, neither
the performance of our scheme nor the underlying field size depends on the number
of files stored. The rate of our scheme depends on the minimum distance of a certain
star product, and in the case where the storage code is a generalized Reed Solomon
(GRS) code (Theorem 10), we can achieve a rate of n−(k+t−1)n .
The capacity (i.e. maximum possible rate) of a PIR scheme for a replicated storage
system was derived in [14] (without collusion) and [13] (with colluding servers). The
corresponding capacity of a coded storage system was given in [1], in the case of
no colluding servers. A previous version of this article conjectured a formula for
the capacity of coded PIR with colluding servers, that gives the capacity bounds
of [1,13] as special cases. However, this conjecture was recently disproven by Sun and
Jafar in [15], who gave an explicit example of a scheme for coded PIR with colluding
servers the rate of which exceeded our conjectured upper bound. The work of [15]
also characterizes the capacity of PIR for MDS coded data with colluding servers
for other parameters, in particular for m = 2 files of length k = n − 1. In general,
however, the capacity of coded PIR with colluding servers remains open. Recently,
another PIR scheme for coded databases with colluding servers was presented in [18]
for MDS coded data. However, the rates achieved in the present work outperform the
rates presented in [18] even for a moderate number of files, and the scheme in [18]
requires the underlying field to be large. The case of a linear storage code that is
not necessarily MDS, without collusion, has been studied in [7]. They show that for
certain codes a rate of n−kn can still be achieved, outperforming the general result in
Theorem 7.
2. Coding-Theoretic Preliminaries. In this section we briefly collect some
standard coding-theoretic definitions and results that we will need in the following
sections.
2.1. Basic Definitions. We will use Fq to denote the field with q elements,
where q is a prime power, and [n] for the set {1, 2, . . . , n}. For any two vectors
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v, w ∈ Fnq , we denote their standard inner product by 〈v, w〉. If V ⊆ Fnq , then we
denote its orthogonal complement by
(1) V ⊥ = {w ∈ Fnq | 〈v, w〉 = 0 for all v ∈ V }
and we write V ⊥W if W ⊆ V ⊥.
For a code C ⊆ Fnq or a vector v ∈ Fnq we use CI and vI to denote their respective
projections onto the coordinates in I ⊆ [n]. The support of a codeword c ∈ Fnq is
supp(c) = {i ∈ [n] : ci 6= 0}, and the support of a code C ⊆ Fnq is supp(C) =
∪c∈C supp(c). The minimum distance of C ⊆ Fnq is
(2) d = dC = min{|I| : |C[n]\I | < |C|}.
For linear codes, this can alternatively be written as
(3) d = min{| supp(c)| : c ∈ C}.
A linear code C ⊆ Fnq of dimension k and with minimum distance d is called an
[n, k, d]-code, or an [n, k, d]q-code if we wish to emphasize the field of definition. By an
elementary result that is usually attributed to Singleton [12], if C is an [n, k, d]-code,
then
(4) d ≤ n− k + 1
A code that satisfies (4) with equality is called a maximum distance separable (MDS)
code. An [n, k, d] MDS code will be more concisely denoted as an [n, k] MDS code,
with d = n− k + 1 being implied.
Given a linear [n, k, d]-code C, a subset K ⊆ [n] of size |K| = k is an information
set of C if the natural projection C → CK is a bijection. Equivalently, the columns of
any generator matrix of C corresponding to the indices in K are linearly independent.
If C is an MDS code, then every K ⊆ [n] of size k is an information set.
The repetition code Rep(n)q ⊆ Fnq is the one-dimensional code generated by the
all-ones vector. It is an [n, 1] MDS code.
2.2. Generalized Reed-Solomon Codes. Our proposed PIR scheme will be
most interesting when the code defining the storage system is a Generalized Reed-
Solomon code. As such, we recall the basic properties of such codes here.
Definition 1 (GRS Codes). Let α = [α1 · · ·αn] ∈ Fnq satisfy αi 6= αj for i 6= j,
and let v = [v1 · · · vn] ∈ F×q n. We define the Generalized Reed-Solomon (GRS) code
of dimension k associated to these n-tuples to be
(5) GRSk(α, v) = {(vif(αi))1≤i≤n | f ∈ Fq[x], deg(f) < k} .
The canonical generator matrix for this code is given by
(6) G(α, v) :=

1 · · · 1
α1 · · · αn
α21 · · · α2n
...
. . .
...
αk−11 · · · αk−1n
 · diag(v),
where diag(v) is the diagonal matrix with the values vi on the diagonal. In data
storage applications, it is often desirable to have an explicit encoding matrix that is
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systematic, i.e. having an identity submatrix in the first k columns. For this purpose,
define
(7) G˜(α, v) :=
f1(α1) · · · f1(αn)... . . . ...
fk(α1) · · · fk(αn)
 · diag(v),
where
fi(x) = v
−1
i
∏
j∈[k]\{i}
x− αj
αi − αj
for i = 1, . . . , k. Note that fi(αi) = v
−1
i and fi(αj) = 0 for j ∈ [k] \ {i}, hence this is
a systematic generator matrix for GRSk(α, v).
The code GRSk(α, v) is an [n, k] MDS code. From the Lagrange interpolation
formula, it follows that the dual of GRSk(α, v) is given by GRSn−k(α, u) where
(8) ui = (vi
∏
j 6=i
(αi − αj))−1.
2.3. Star Products. The star product of two codes will play an integral role in
our PIR scheme, essentially determining its rate.
Definition 2. Let V,W be sub-vector spaces of Fnq . We define the star (or Schur)
product V ? W to be the subspace of Fnq generated by the Hadamard products v ? w =
[v1w1 · · · vnwn] for all pairs v ∈ V,w ∈W .
The following proposition collects some basic properties of the star product that
will prove useful in the coming sections.
Proposition 3. The star product satisfies the following properties:
(i) If C is any linear code in Fnq and Rep(n)q ⊆ Fnq is the repetition code of length
n over Fq, then C ? Rep(n)q = C.
(ii) If C and D are any linear codes in Fnq with supp(C) = supp(D) = [n], and
(C ? D)⊥ = H, then dH ≥ dC⊥ + dD⊥ − 2.
(iii) If C ⊆ Fnq is any MDS code, then (C ? C⊥)⊥ = Rep(n)q.
(iv) The star product of two generalized Reed-Solomon codes in Fnq with the same
parameter α is again a generalized Reed-Solomon code with parameter α.
More specifically, GRSk(α, v) ? GRS`(α,w) = GRSmin{k+`−1,n}(α, v ? w) for
any parameters v, w.
Proof. Property (i) follows immediately from the definition of the star product.
Property (ii) is Theorem 5 of [17]. To see that property (iii) holds, let H = (C?C⊥)⊥.
The containment Rep(n)q ⊆ H is obvious for any code C. If C is an [n, k] MDS code
then C⊥ is an [n, n−k] MDS code, so property (ii) implies that dH ≥ dC+dC⊥−2 = n.
Hence by the Singleton bound the dimension of H is 1 and therefore H = Rep(n)q.
To see that property (iv) holds, consider some arbitrary codewords (vif(αi)) ∈
GRSk(α, v) and (wig(αi)) ∈ GRS`(α,w). We clearly have
(9) (vif(αi)) ? (wig(αi)) = (viwi(fg)(αi)) ∈ GRSmin{k+`−1,n}(α, v ? w)
hence the containment GRSk(α, v) ? GRS`(α,w) ⊆ GRSmin{k+`−1,n}(α, v ? w) holds.
To see the reverse containment, note that GRSmin{k+`−1,n}(α, v ? w) is generated as
an Fq-vector space by codewords of the form (viwifm(αi)) where fm(x) = xm is a
monomial of degree m < k + `− 1. We can clearly decompose such a codeword as
(10) (viwifm(αi)) = (vifa(αi)) ? (wifb(αi))
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where fa(x) = x
a and fb(x) = x
b for any a, b such that a < k, b < `, and a+ b = m.
This shows the reverse inclusion and completes the proof.
3. Coded Storage and Private Information Retrieval. Let us describe the
distributed storage systems we consider; this setup follows that of [1, 16]. To provide
clear and concise notation, we have consistently used superscripts to refer to files,
subscripts to refer to servers, and parenthetical indices for entries of a vector. So,
for example, the query qij is sent to the j
th server when downloading the ith file, and
yij(a) is the a
th entry of the vector yij stored on server j.
Suppose we have files x1, . . . , xm ∈ Fb×kq . Data storage proceeds by arranging the
files into a bm× k matrix
(11) X =
x
1
...
xm

Each file xi is encoded using a linear [n, k, d]-code C with generator matrix GC into
an encoded file yi = xiGC . In matrix form, we encode the matrix X into a matrix Y
by right-multiplying by GC :
(12) Y = XGC =
 y
1
...
ym
 = [y1 · · · yn] =
 y
1
1 · · · y1n
...
. . .
...
ym1 · · · ymn

The jth column yj ∈ Fbm×1q of the matrix Y is stored by the jth server. Here the
vector yij ∈ Fb×1q represents the part of the ith file stored on the jth server.
Such a storage system allows any dC−1 servers to fail while still allowing users to
successfully access any of the files xi. In particular, if C is an MDS code, the resulting
distributed storage system is maximally robust against server failures.
Private Information Retrieval (PIR) is the process of downloading a file from a
database without revealing to the database which file is being downloaded [5]. Here
by ‘database’ we mean a collection of servers, e.g. all of the n servers used in the
distributed storage system described earlier.
Definition 4. Suppose we have a distributed storage system as described above.
A linear PIR scheme over Fq for such a storage system consists of:
1. For each index i ∈ [m], a probability space (Qi, µi) of queries. When the user
wishes to download xi ∈ Fb×kq , a query qi ∈ Qi is selected randomly according
to the probability measure µi. Each q
i is a set qi = {qi1, . . . , qin}, where qij is
sent to the jth server, and furthermore qij is itself a row vector of the form
(13) qij = [q
i1
j · · · qimj ] where qi`j ∈ F1×bq , for all ` ∈ [m].
2. Responses rij = 〈qij , yj〉 ∈ Fq which the servers compute and transmit to the
user. We set ri = [ri1 · · · rin] to be the total response vector.
3. An iteration process, which repeats Steps 1.-2. a total of s times until the
desired file xi can be reconstructed from the s responses ri
3. A reconstruction function which takes as input the various ri over all of the
s iterations and returns the file xi.
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Here we view b and s as secondary parameters, which we are free to adjust to
enable the user to download exactly one whole file. If one restricts to the case of b = 1
row per file, the size of the file k may be too small, in which case it is not clear how
to take advantage of a high rate scheme which inherently downloads more symbols
per iteration than there are in a file. On the other hand, restricting to schemes with
s = 1 iteration may fail to download an entire file. The freedom to adjust b and s
allows one to avoid such complications.
The rate of a PIR scheme measures its efficiency, by comparing the size of a file
with how much information we downloaded in total:
Definition 5. The rate of a linear PIR scheme is defined to be bkns .
Note that Definition 5 ignores the cost to the user of uploading the queries to
the servers. This can be justified by considering xi ∈ V b×k where V is some finite-
dimensional vector space over Fq, and encoding and data retrieval proceeds in an
obvious way. In this setting the size of the queries is easily seen to be minimal in
comparison to download costs when dimV  1.
It would be more precise to define rate as bkE[w(qi)]s , where E(·) denotes expectation
and w(qi) is the number of queries qij which are not the zero vector, since such queries
can be ignored. For comparison with earlier work on PIR we use Definition 5 for the
remainder of this paper.
Definition 6. A PIR scheme protects against t colluding servers if for every set
T = {j1, . . . , jt} ⊆ [n] of size t, we have
(14) I(QiT ; i) = 0
where QiT denotes the joint distribution of all tuples {qij1 , . . . , qijt} of queries sent to
the servers in T as we range over all s iterations of the PIR scheme, and I(· ; ·)
denotes the mutual information of two random variables.
In other words, for every set T of servers of size t, there exists a probability
distribution (QT , µT ) such that for all i ∈ [m], the projection of (Qi, µi) to the
coordinates in T is (QT , µT ). Hence, no subset of servers of size t will learn anything
about the index i of the file that is being requested. If a PIR scheme protects against
t colluding servers, it also clearly protects against t′ colluding servers for all t′ ≤ t.
4. A General PIR Scheme for Coded Storage with Colluding Servers.
Our goal is to find high-rate PIR schemes which protect against many colluding
servers. To that end, the following construction provides a general PIR scheme for
coded databases which protects against a flexible number of colluding servers.
4.1. Scheme Construction. Let C be a linear [n, k, d]q code with generator
matrix GC , and consider the distributed storage system Y = XGC as in Section 3.
We choose another linear code D ⊆ Fnq , the retrieval code. As we will see, the retrieval
code essentially determines the privacy properties of the scheme.
Throughout this section, i will denote the index of the file we wish to retrieve.
We begin by simplifying notation, defining
(15) c := dC?D − 1.
The queries are constructed so that the total response vector during one iteration is
of the form
(16) ri = (codeword of C ? D) + y˜i
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where y˜i is a vector containing c distinct symbols of yi in known locations, and zeros
elsewhere. Multiplying ri by a generator matrix of (C ?D)⊥ then allows us to recover
these c symbols.
To allow the user to download exactly one file over s iterations, we force the file
size bk to be an integer multiple of c by setting
(17) b =
lcm(c, k)
k
and s =
lcm(c, k)
c
so that bk = sc. During each iteration of the scheme, we download
(18) g :=
k
s
=
c
b
symbols from every row of yi. After s iterations, the scheme will have downloaded
sg = k symbols of the ath row yi,a of yi for all a ∈ [b].
We also fix a subset J ⊆ [n] of servers of size
(19) |J | = max{c, k}
which stays constant throughout the scheme. By reindexing the servers if necessary,
we may assume without loss of generality that
(20) J = {1, . . . , |J |}
The set J will be the set of all servers from which we obtain encoded symbols. We
will also make use of sets Jau ⊆ J where u ∈ [s] and a ∈ [b], which are defined so that
during the uth iteration we obtain the symbol yij(a) from every server j ∈ Jau .
For clarity of presentation, we will describe Steps 1.-2. in detail for the first itera-
tion of the scheme, which will help elucidate the structure of the queries and responses
of subsequent iterations.
1. Query Construction: We select mb codewords d`,a = [d`,a(1) · · · d`,a(n)] uni-
formly at random from D for ` ∈ [m] and a ∈ [b]. For ` ∈ [m] and j ∈ [n], define
(21) d`j =
[
d`,1(j) · · · d`,b(j)] ∈ F1×bq and dj = [d1j · · · dmj ] ∈ F1×mbq
We partition J1 := [c] ⊆ J into b subsets as follows:
(22) J11 = {1, . . . , g}, J21 = {g + 1, . . . , 2g}, . . . , Jb1 = {g(b− 1), . . . , gb = c}
and define the queries qij by
(23) qij =
{
dj + eb(i−1)+a if j ∈ Ja1
dj if j 6∈ J1
where eb(i−1)+a ∈ F1×mbq denotes the (b(i− 1) + a)th standard basis vector. Thus for
j ∈ Ja1 , the query qij is simply dj but with the entry di,a(j) replaced with di,a(j) + 1.
2. Responses: To understand the response vector ri, we first calculate rij for
j 6∈ J1. We have
(24) rij = 〈qij , yj〉 = 〈dj , yj〉 =
m∑
`=1
〈d`j , y`j〉 =
m∑
`=1
b∑
a=1
d`,a(j)y`j(a).
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For j ∈ Ja01 for some a0 ∈ [b], the same calculation reveals that
(25) rij =
m∑
`=1
b∑
a=1
d`,a(j)y`j(a) + y
i
j(a0).
We see that the value of the total response vector during the first iteration is
(26) ri =
m∑
`=1
b∑
a=1
d
`,a(1)y`1(a)
...
d`,a(n)y`n(a)
+

yi1(1)
...
yig(1)
...
yig(b−1)(b)
...
yic(b)
0(n−c)×1

=
m∑
`=1
b∑
a=1
d`,a ? y`,a︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈C?D
+

yi1(1)
...
yig(1)
...
yig(b−1)(b)
...
yic(b)
0(n−c)×1

where y`,a ∈ C is the ath row of y`.
3. Iteration: During the uth iteration for u = 2, . . . , s, we repeat Steps 1.-2. but
recursively define the subset Jau ⊆ J to be the cyclic shift of Jau−1 within J to the
right by g indices. Thus if Jau−1 = {j1, . . . , jg}, then
(27) Jau = {j1 + g, j2 + g, . . . , jg + g}
where if j ∈ Jau satisfies j > |J |, it is replaced with (j − 1) (mod |J |) + 1. We let
Ju = J
1
u ∪ · · · ∪ Jbu and define the queries during the uth iteration by
(28) qij =
{
dj + eb(i−1)+a if j ∈ Jau
dj if j 6∈ Ju
The response vector ri during the uth iteration is of the form
(29) ri = (codeword of C ? D) + yiJu
where yiJu is a vector with entries y
i
j(a) in some known positions for all j ∈ Jau and
all a ∈ [b], and zeros elsewhere.
4. Data Reconstruction: Let S be a generator matrix for (C ? D)⊥. Since c =
dC?D − 1, every c columns of S are linearly independent. To reconstruct the file xi,
we begin by considering the response vector ri from the first iteration, and computing
(30) Sri = S(codeword of C ? D) + S

yi1(1)
...
yic(b)
0(n−c)×1
 = S

yi1(1)
...
yic(b)
0(n−c)×1
 .
From Sri we can obtain the values of yi1(1), . . . , y
i
c(b), since the first c columns of S
are linearly independent. If ri is instead the response during the uth iteration of the
scheme, we similarly obtain all entries of the form yij(a) for j ∈ Jau and a ∈ [b] from
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Fig. 1. Visualizing the PIR scheme of Section 4.1. On the left, downloading from a system
with parameters (k, c, n) = (6, 4, 10). Since k > c, we have J = {1, . . . , k}, and the scheme requires
b = 2 rows and s = 3 iterations. On the right, a system with parameters (k, c, n) = (4, 6, 10). Here
c > k, so J = {1, . . . , c} and the scheme requires b = 3 rows and s = 2 iterations. Depicted is the
encoded file yi ∈ Fb×nq , along with the encoded symbols downloaded in the first (red), second (blue),
and third (green) iterations. The columns which contain colored blocks are those in J.
the product Sri. For a fixed row a, the sets Ja1 , . . . , J
a
s are disjoint and consist of
sg = k servers in total, hence we retrieve k distinct symbols of yi,a for every row a.
One can visualize the entire PIR scheme as in Fig. 1, wherein we show what por-
tions of the encoded file yi we are downloading during each iteration, for parameters
k = 6, c = 4, and n = 10 (in the left-hand figure). Here each file consists of b = 2
rows, and the scheme requires s = 3 iterations. We have J = {1, . . . , k} and the sets
Jau are given by
(31)
J11 = {1, 2}, J21 = {3, 4}
J12 = {3, 4}, J22 = {5, 6}
J13 = {5, 6}, J23 = {1, 2}
In Fig. 1 we denote the encoded symbols downloaded during the first iteration in red,
during the second iteration in blue, and during the third iteration in green.
In the right-hand side of Fig. 1 we repeat this exercise for parameters k = 4,
c = 6, and n = 10. In this case we have b = 3 rows per file and require s = 2
iterations. The sets Jau are given by
(32)
J11 = {1, 2}, J21 = {3, 4}, J31 = {5, 6}
J12 = {3, 4}, J22 = {5, 6}, J32 = {1, 2}
which are depicted in Fig. 1.
4.2. Proofs of Correctness and Privacy. In this section we provide proofs
that the PIR scheme described in the previous subsection is correct (retrieves the
desired file) and preserves privacy (does not reveal the index i of the desired file to
any group of t colluding servers).
Theorem 7. Let C be an [n, k, d]-code and suppose we have a retrieval code D
such that either (i) dC?D−1 ≤ k, or (ii) there exists J ⊆ [n] of size max{dC?D−1, k}
such that every subset of J of size k is an information set of C. Then the PIR scheme
of Section 4.1 is correct, that is, retrieves the desired file with rate (dC?D − 1)/n.
Proof. If condition (i) is satisfied, we choose J ⊆ [n] of size k to be any information
set of C. In the data reconstruction phase of the PIR scheme, we retrieve k symbols
from each row yi,a of yi, corresponding to the columns belonging to J . Since every
K ⊆ J of size k is an information set, this suffices to recover every yi,a and therefore
all of xi. The rate of the scheme is easily seen to be
(33)
bk
ns
=
k · lcm(c,k)k
n · lcm(c,k)c
=
dC?D − 1
n
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which completes the proof.
Theorem 8. Then the PIR scheme described in Section 4.1 protects against
dD⊥ − 1 colluding servers.
Proof. Let T = {j1, . . . , jt} ⊆ [n] be a set of servers of size t ≤ dD⊥ − 1. We
begin by showing that during a single iteration, we have I(qij1 , . . . , q
i
jt
; i) = 0. From
t ≤ dD⊥ − 1 it follows immediately that every t columns of the generator matrix of D
are linearly independent. Therefore the code DT is the entire space Ftq.
First consider the distribution of one of the vectors
(34) dj = [d
1,1(j) · · · d1,b(j) · · · dm,1(j) · · · dm,b(j)] ∈ F1×bmq
for a single j ∈ T . As D{j} is distributed uniformly on Fq, and the codewords d`,a
are selected uniformly at random from D, it follows that dj is uniform on F1×bmq .
Similarly, as DT is all of Ftq, we see that the joint distribution {dj | j ∈ T} is
uniform over
(
F1×bmq
)t
. If f(i, j) denotes the index of the standard basis vector as in
(23) and (28), we see that
(35) {qij1 , . . . , qijt} = {dj + ef(i,j) | j ∈ T ∩ J} ∪ {dj | j ∈ T \ J}
is uniformly distributed for all i, as translating the uniform distribution by any vector
results again in the uniform distribution. The distribution {qij1 , . . . , qijt} of the queries
is therefore independent of the index i of the desired file, hence I(qij1 , . . . , q
i
jt
; i) = 0
is satisfied for a single iteration.
Now consider the joint distribution QiT of all queries to all servers in T , as we
range over all iterations of the scheme. For each iteration, the vectors d`,a are chosen
independently of all other iterations, from which arguments identical to the above
show that QiT is uniform on
(
F1×bmq
)ts
. Thus I(QiT ; i) = 0 as desired.
4.3. Examples. In this subsection we show how some previously constructed
PIR schemes fit into the general framework of our scheme. Throughout this section,
we assume that i is the index of the file we wish to retrieve. In case either b = 1 or
s = 1, we will suppress all indices relating to rows or iterations, respectively.
Example 1. Let C be any systematic [n, k, d] storage code and set D = Rep(n) so
that C?D = C. The above-outlined scheme has rate (dC−1)/n and as dD⊥−1 = 1, it
only provides privacy against non-colluding servers (t = 1). For simplicity we assume
dC − 1|k, and therefore require only b = 1 row per file but s = k/(dC − 1) iterations.
We set J = [k].
As D = Rep(n), sampling from D uniformly at random amounts to sampling
uniformly at random from Fq itself. Thus the query construction in this example
amounts to selecting a single vector d0 = [d
1 · · · dm] ∈ Fmq uniformly at random, and
setting d1 = · · · = dn = d0. Now set J1 = [dC − 1] and define the queries by
(36) qij =
{
d0 + ei if j ∈ J1
d0 if j 6∈ J1
The total response vector is then easily seen to be
(37) ri =
m∑
`=1
d`y` +

yi(1)
...
yi(dC − 1)
0(n−(dC−1))×1

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Let S be a generator matrix of C⊥ which is in systematic form. Then
(38) Sri =
[
yi(1) · · · yi(dC − 1)
]
=
[
xi(1) · · ·xi(dC − 1)
]
In the second iteration, we obtain J2 by shifting J1 to the next set of dC − 1 servers
and repeat the above in the obvious way. After k/(dC − 1) iterations we recover
[yi(1) · · · yi(k)] = xi. Privacy against any single server is clear, since for a fixed j the
queries qij are independent samples of the uniform distribution on Fmq .
This is essentially a paraphrasing of the scheme of [16, Theorem 1] in the language
of our construction. However, in [16], the scheme is only presented for MDS codes.
Example 2. Let C be any [n, k] MDS code and set D = C⊥. We have (C?D)⊥ =
Rep(n) by Proposition 3 (iv). Since dC?D − 1 = 1 and dD⊥ − 1 = n − k, the above-
outlined scheme has rate 1/n and provides privacy against any n−k colluding servers.
We have b = 1 row per file and require s = k iterations of the scheme. We set
J = [k] and J1 = {1}, so that the queries in the first iteration are given by
(39) qij =
{
dj + ei if j = 1
dj if j > 1
where the vectors dj ∈ Fnq are as in the construction. The response vector is
(40) ri =
m∑
`=1
d` ? y` +
[
yi(1)
0(n−1)×1
]
where d` ∈ D and y` ∈ C. As (C ?D)⊥ = Rep(n), the reconstruction function takes a
particularly simple form. In particular we can take S = [1 · · · 1], and see immediately
that Sr = yi(1). Iterating this procedure k times while setting Ju = {u} for u ∈ [k]
yields [yi(1) · · · yi(k)], which suffice to reconstruct xi by the MDS property.
This is the scheme of [16, Theorem 2], again rephrased in the context of our
scheme.
Example 3. Let C = Rep(n) and let D be any [n, t] MDS code. We have dC?D−
1 = dD−1 = n−t and dD⊥−1 = t. The above-outlined scheme thus has rate (n−t)/n
and provides privacy against any t colluding servers. We have b = n− t rows per file
but require only s = 1 iteration of the scheme. We set J = [n− t].
With dj ∈ F1×m(n−t)q as in the scheme construction, the queries qij are of the form
(41) qij =
{
dj + e(n−t)(i−1)+j if j ∈ J
dj if j 6∈ J
which yields a response vector of the form
(42) ri =
m∑
`=1
n−t∑
a=1
x`(a)d`,a +

xi(1)
...
xi(n− t)
0t×1

If S is a generator matrix of D⊥ in systematic form, then Sri = xi which completes
the retrieval scheme.
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4.4. Remarks on Scheme Construction. Theorem 7 implies that for any
storage code C at all, provided that we choose D such that dC?D − 1 ≤ k, we can
choose J to be any information set of C and achieve rate (dC?D−1)/n and protection
against dD⊥ − 1 colluding servers. In particular, if C is any MDS code then we can
choose any subset J of servers of size |J | = max{dC?D − 1, k}. Thus the scheme
achieves the stated rate and protection against collusion for any MDS storage code C
and any retrieval code D.
It is likely that condition (ii) in Theorem 7 is somewhat conservative. We do not
really need every subset of J of size k to be an information set of C, only subsets of
the form Ja1 ∪ · · · ∪ Jas for a ∈ [b], which index the servers retrieving symbols from
the ath row of yi. However, we prefer to state condition (ii) as it is for the sake of
simplicity.
Theorem 8 implies that we must have supp(D) = [n] to achieve any non-trivial
privacy with our scheme. For if supp(D) 6= [n] then we would have some standard
basis vector in D⊥, implying dD⊥ − 1 = 0. This can be interpreted by saying that
every server has to see some amount of randomness.
It may be the case that the user does not have the freedom to adjust the number
of rows in a file. For example, each file might be stored as a single row of X, in
which case it is not obvious how to take advantage of a scheme which downloads more
symbols per iteration than there are in a file. One way to remedy this is to simply
have the user download multiple files. Thus one could rephrase Example 3 so that the
user downloads n− t files from the database, instead of one file which consists of n− t
symbols. However, according to recent results [2], the capacity of such multi-message
PIR is higher than that of single-message PIR. Thus to make a more valid comparison
with known rate and capacity results, we have chosen to describe our schemes as only
retrieving one file.
While our interest in this paper is in download cost, we observe that the user in
each iteration of our scheme uploads bnm symbols from Fq, for a total of bnms total
uploaded symbols. In particular, while the download cost does not depend on the
number of files stored, the upload cost grows linearly in m. While the upload cost is
also depends linearly on b and s, the size of the file does as well, so while the upload
cost grows with these parameters, so does the total amount of privately downloaded
information.
5. Private Information Retrieval from GRS Codes. In [16], two PIR
schemes were presented for arbitrary [n, k] MDS codes, one of which had rate 1n
and protected against t = n − k colluding servers, and the other of which had rate
n−k
n and t = 1. These schemes are essentially variations of Example 1 and Example 2
in this paper. The authors asked if one can adapt their schemes in the “intermediate
regime” where 1 < t < n − k for arbitrary n and k. In this section, we show how to
do this via the construction in Section 4 for some suitably chosen [n, k] MDS storage
codes, namely for GRS codes.
By Proposition 3 we know that the class of all GRS codes associated to a fixed
n-tuple α ∈ Fnq is closed under taking star products and duals. Moreover, while the
dimension of a star product C ? D of two generic codes can be as high as dim(C) ·
dim(D), in the case of GRS codes it is only dim(C)+dim(D)−1, which is useful when
we want to maximize minimum distances. Indeed, the following theorem from [9],
which can be seen as a multiplicative version of the Singleton bound, shows that
among all storage codes, our PIR schemes gives the best privacy-rate tradeoff precisely
for GRS storage codes.
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Theorem 9 (Immediate corollary of [9], Theorem 2 and [8], Theorem 14). Let
C1 and C2 be linear codes of dimension k1 and k2 and support [n]. Then
(43) dC1?C2 − 1 ≤ max{0, n− (k1 + k2 − 1)}.
Conversely, if neither C1, C2, nor (C1 ?C2)
⊥ is the length n repetition code, then the
above bound is an equality exactly when both C1 and C2 are GRS codes.
By Proposition 3 (iv), GRS codes satisfy Theorem 9 with equality. The following
theorem instantiates our scheme in the case where the storage code C and retrieval
code D are GRS.
Theorem 10. Let C = GRSk(α, v) and consider the distributed storage system
Y = XGC as in Section 3. Then for all t such that 1 ≤ t ≤ n − k, there exists a
retrieval code D such that the PIR scheme constructed in Section 4 has rate n−(k+t−1)n
and protects against any t colluding servers.
Proof. We will give a linear code D satisfying dD⊥ − 1 = t and dC?D − 1 =
n − (k + t − 1); the theorem then follows immediately from Theorems 7 and 8. Let
D = GRSt(α, u) for an arbitrary vector u ∈ F×q n, since its dual is also MDS we see
that dD⊥ = t + 1. Then (C ? D)
⊥ = GRSn−k−t+1(α,w) with w given by (8). It
follows that dC?D − 1 = n− (k + t− 1) as desired.
When k + t > n our PIR scheme has rate zero, regardless of the storage code
chosen. This can be seen readily from Theorem 9, as the retrieval code D must have
rank at least t, so dC?D − 1 ≤ max{0, n − (k + t − 1)} = 0 and thus the number of
retrieved symbols per iteration is dC?D − 1 = 0.
When k = 1, that is, the data is stored via a replication system, our scheme
provides a rate of n−tn . It is known by [13] that the capacity for PIR in this case is
1−t/n
1−(t/n)m . Thus our scheme is asymptotically capacity-achieving, in that the resulting
rates approach capacity as the number of files m→∞.
Similarly, when t = 1, that is, without server collusion, our scheme provides a
rate of n−kn . By [1] the capacity for PIR in this case is
1−k/n
1−(k/n)m , thus our schemes
are again asymptotically capacity-achieving.
The capacity of coded PIR with colluding servers is known when m = 2 and
k = n − 1 by [15], but no general result is known for k > 1 and t > 1. A previous
version of this article conjectured the following:
Conjecture 1 (Disproven, see [15]). Let C be an [n, k, d] code that stores m files
via the distributed storage system Y = XGC , and fix 1 ≤ t ≤ n− k. Any PIR scheme
for Y that protects against any t colluding servers has rate at most
1− k+t−1n
1−( k+t−1n )
m .
However, this conjecture was disproven in [15], where the authors exhibited an explicit
PIR scheme for m = 2 files distributed over n = 4 servers using a rate 1/2 storage
code C, which protects against t = 2 collusion. The exhibited scheme has rate 3/5,
while our conjectured capacity was 4/7.
We will refrain from stating any further conjectures on the capacity of coded PIR
with server collusion. However, the question remains open as to whether our schemes
are asymptotically capacity-achieving asm→∞ for general k and t. This is consistent
with the results in [15], where it is also proven that, although positive retrieval rates
are possible when k + t > n, the rates decrease to 0 as m → ∞. We further remark
that the rate of our schemes do not depend on the number of files stored, and the field
size required to achieve the rates of Theorem 10 is only q ≥ n, needed to guarantee
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Fig. 2. Achievable PIR rates for n = 12 servers and m = 8 files, as a function of t = the
number of colluding servers, for various storage code rates. The black curve represents the PIR
capacity for the case of k = 1 (data stored via a replication system) as computed from [13]. The
asterisks show the capacity for the non-colluding case t = 1 as given in [1]. The PIR capacity is
unknown when t ≥ 2 and k ≥ 2.
the existence of GRS codes. This is in contrast with the capacity-achieving schemes
of [14], [13], [15], wherein the field size grows as q = O(nm). Similarly, for the scheme
of [18] for MDS coded data with colluding servers, which outperforms our scheme
with the number of files m is small, the field size is required to satisfy q ≥ O ((nk)).
In Fig. 2 we plot for n = 12 servers the achievable PIR rates as a function of the
number of colluding servers t, for various code rates k/n. The black curve represents
the capacity for the case of k = 1, that is, when the data is stored using a replication
system [13], while the asterisks represent the capacity obtained in [1] for the non-
colluding case t = 1 at different code rates. One can see that even for a relatively
small number of files and relatively large amount of collusion, our scheme is quite
close to capacity.
6. An example in the intermediate regime. We will illustrate our scheme
with an explicit example in the case when t = 2 and k = 2. This is the first case not
covered by our Examples 1–3. The storage code C is MDS, with [n, k, d] = [5, 2, 4].
We will have c = k = 2 and hence we require only b = 1 row per file and s = 1
iteration, thus we are free to ignore these parameters in what follows.
Example 4. Let α = [0, 1, 2, 3, 4] ∈ F55 and let 1 ∈ F55 be the all-ones vector. Con-
sider the storage code C = GRS2(α,1) over F5, encoded by its systematic generator
matrix
(44) GC :=
[
1 0 4 3 2
0 1 2 3 4
]
as in (7). So each file xi is divided into two blocks xi(1) and xi(2), and distributed
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onto the five servers as follows:
(45)

xi(1) on server 1
xi(2) on server 2
4xi(1) + 2xi(2) on server 3
3xi(1) + 3xi(2) on server 4
2xi(1) + 4xi(2) on server 5.
The random codewords d1, . . . , dm used to query the servers will be drawn from
D = GRS2(α,1), for which we choose the canonical generator matrix
(46) GD :=
[
1 1 1 1 1
0 1 2 3 4
]
.
Note that D⊥ is a [5, 3] MDS code, so our scheme protects against t = dD⊥ − 1 = 2
colluding servers. The reason we choose different generator matrices for C and D is
practical, as the systematic generator matrix is better for decoding, while the canonical
generator matrix is preferable for computations.
Observe that C ?D = GRS3(α,1). We compute its dual (C ?D)
⊥ = GRS2(α, u),
where ui = (
∏
j 6=i(αi − αj))−1 for i = 1, . . . , 5. Since αi runs over the entire field
F5, these products are unusually easy to evaluate, indeed we have ui = −1 for all
i = 1, . . . , 5. Thus (C ? D)⊥ = GRS2(α,−1) = GRS2(α,1) so (C ? D)⊥ is identical
to C and we use the same generator matrix GH = GC .
For each file index ` ∈ [m], we sample uniformly at random from D by multiplying
GD on the left by a uniform random vector z
` = [z`(1), z`(2)] ∈ F25, so that d` =
z`GD and dj = [d
1(j) · · · dm(j)] for j ∈ [m]. We let z1 = [z`(1) · · · zm(1)] and z2 =
[z1(2) · · · zm(2)] which are independent and uniformly distributed over Fm5 .
Suppose we want to retrieve the file xi for some i ∈ [m]. We select dC?D − 1 = 2
servers from which to download blocks from xi, and for simplicity we here choose the
systematic nodes. The queries qij sent to the servers will now be the following vectors
in Fm5 :
(47)
qi1 = d1 + ei = z1 + ei
qi2 = d2 + ei = z1 + z2 + ei
qi3 = d3 = z1 + 2z2
qi4 = d4 = z1 + 3z2
qi5 = d5 = z1 + 4z2
where ei is the i
th standard basis vector. Observe that for each pair of servers, the
corresponding joint distribution of queries is the uniform distribution over (Fm5 )2.
The servers now respond by projecting their stored data onto the query vector,
whence we obtain a response vector
(48) ri =

∑m
`=1 d
`(1)x`(1) +xi(1)∑m
`=1(d
`(1) + d`(2))x`(2) +xi(2)∑m
`=1(d
`(1) + 2d`(2))(4x`(1) + 2x`(2))∑m
`=1(d
`(1) + 3d`(2))(3x`(1) + 2x`(2))∑m
`=1(d
`(1) + 4d`(2))(2x`(1) + 4x`(2))
 ∈ C ? D +

xi(1)
xi(2)
0
0
0
 .
To finally decode the desired symbols, we now compute the matrix product G(C?D)⊥ ·ri.
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One calculates that indeed
(49) G(C?D)⊥ · ri = G(C?D)⊥ ·

xi(1)
xi(2)
0
0
0
 =
[
xi(1)
xi(2)
]
.
We have therefore extracted the two desired data blocks using 5 queries, while main-
taining privacy against t = 2 colluding servers.
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